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RALPH A.OUNGAs A BACKGROUND for understanding the factors that have
controlled real invcstmcnt and consumers' outlay and their
bearing upon the present situation, this paper surveys
briefly the proportions that have gone into these two com-
ponents of national income in this country during thelast
six decades. The analysis must be tentative, not only be-
cause the estimates are crude andpreliminary but also
because our knowledge of what determines the division of
the national product between ultimate consumption and
real investment is so incomplete. Yet from the little we
know we must try to come to some conclusions.
THE PAST COURSE OF CAPITAL FORMATION ANDCONSUMERS'
OUTLAY
Real investment or capital formation as measured here
comprises (i) the value of producers' durable equipment
(machinery, trucks, etc.) reaching the business and public
enterprises that use it, at cost to them; (2) the value, at cost,
of all new construction including major repairs and altera-
tions (residential, commercial, industrial, public utility,
semipublic, public); () net additions to stocks of commodi-
ties held as inventories by business enterprises; (4) changes
in net claims by individuals, firms, and public units in this
country against individuals, firms,and public units in other
countries. The sum of these four components is the part of
the current national product that is diverted fromimmedi-
ate consumption into additions to thecapital of business
and public enterprises. While it accounts for the major por-
tion of the current increment to the country'stotal wealth,
it omits some items.1
1 These omissions comprise some additions to tangible wealth, such as in-
creases in commodity stocks of nonbusinessenteiprises and of households;
all investment in the productive capacity of the individuals who make up the
nation; all additions to values of intangible assets (such as goodwill), even
though attained by actual outlay; all purely pecuniary appreciationof
assets; and all additions that result not from currentproduction but from
the bounty of incalculable providence (e.g., discovery of oil in excess of the
3
.Capital formation so defined can be estimated gross or net
of the current consumption of durable capital, i.e., of pro-
ducers' durable machinery and equipment and of struc-
tures. For many purposes. especially consideration of short
term problems, gross capital formation may be more rele-
vant and useful than net.
Net capital formation is one component of the net na-
tional product or national income; the other is consumers'
outlay, i.e., the value, at cost to ultimate consumers, of the
finished commodities and services that flow to them. Gross
capital formation can be treated as a component of gross
national product, i.e., of national income taken gross of the
durable capital consumed in production. Gross national
product is the sum of gross capital formation and consumers'
outlay.
Capital formation as estimated here includes residential
construction, but omits consumers' durable goods (such as
passenger cars, furniture, heavy household equipment).
However, from the totals we can estimate the value of con-
sumers' durable commodities as well as of three other coni-
ponents of consumers' outlay:perishable commodities,
semidurable commodities, and services not embodied in new
commodities. We therefore have a fourfold breakdown of
both consumers' outlay (perishable, semidurable, con-
sumers' durable, services not embodied in new commod-
ities) and capital formation (all construction, producers'
durable, inventories, claims against foreign countries), or a
breakdown of the national product into eight categories.
Approximate as the estimates are, they give a rough picture
of the constitution of our national product from1879to
(note x conci.)
cost of discovery). Under all these categories there may be not only addi-
tions to wealth, but also drafts upon it. Since we exclude additions under
these categories from capital formation (gross), we exclude drafts upon
capital under these categories in estimating capital consumption.
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S1938, viewed in terms of its utilization either for direct ulti-
mate consumption or for capital formation.2
After these estimates were published, we calculated totals
also for overlapping decades (i.e., not only for 1879-88,
1889-98, etc., but also for 1884-93, i8igo. etc.), so that
for the sixty years we have eleven overlapping decades, the
midpoints of each pair separated by five years. The esti-
mates are in both current and constant prices (as of i 929),
but our main interest is in the apportionment of the real
product rather than of monetary values expressed in a
changing monetary unit. As all these shares are for decades,
they are not affected by short term fluctuations.
i) In 1929 prices the share of gross capital formation in
gross national product ranged prior to 1919-28 from 22 to
25 per cent (Table i). The secular stability that character-
ized the share of gross capital formation until the 'twenties
gave place to a decline. During 1919-28 the share shrank to
one-fifth; during the next decade, which included the se-
vere depression, it shrank to 14 per cent.
In current prices (prices actually prevailing in successive
years of the record) the share of gross capital formation in
gross national product is even more stable. The percentages
fluctuate between 20 and 21 during the decades from
1879-88 to 1919-28, then decline to 15 jfl 1929-38.
2) The decade shares of net capital formation in net
national product fluctuate somewhat more (Table 2). Yet
for the first 40 or 50 years no long term trend is evident. In
1929 prices the share ranges from 12 to 15 per cent through
the 1914-23 decade, then drops to 2 per cent in 1929-38.
In current prices, it remains through 1919-28 at a level of
about ii per cent, then drops to3 per cent in the last decade.
) If we add consumers' durable commodities to capital
2 They were first presented for six decades in a paper read in the autumn of
io at the Bicentennial Conference, University of Pennsylvania (published
in Studies in &on,mics and Industrial Relations, University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, ii, pp. 53-78).
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formation, the share of gross capital formationin gross
national pwduct ini 929 prices is raised to a level of 27-30
per cent; and the share of net capital formation in national
income, to a level of 17-21per cent through the 1920's
(Table 3).3 They decline only during the lasttwo overlap-
ping decades which include the depressionyears after 1929.
4) The share of consumers' outlay in the national prod-
uct and its behavior are, of course, determined bythe size
of the other component, capital formation,its stability dur-
ing the first eight decades, and itsdecline during the last
three. Consumers' outlay (includingconsumers' durable
commodities) accounted for 75-78per cent of gross national
product and for 85-88per cent of national income. Fairly
stable until the 1920's, it increasedsomewhat during that
decade largely because of the increasein the share of con-
sumers' durable goods; and increasedeven more with the
oncoming of the depression andthe contraction in the
national product. During 1929-38it accounted for 85-86
per cent of gross national product and for97-98 per cent of
national income.
) Of the four components of capital formation,construc-
tion is by far the largest, followedby producers' durable
goods, net additions to inventories,and net changes in
claims against foreign countries(Tables 4 and). But there
are marked shifts in their relative shares.In 1929 prices the
share of construction definitelydeclines, especially ingross
capital formation (from abouttwo-thirds in the earlier
decades to somewhatover one-half in the later); that of
producers' durable more thandoubles (rising from about
one-sixth in gross capital formationto over one-third). The
share of net additionsto inventories, accounting for about
one-tenth of gross capital formationand about one-fifth of
net, does not show a marked trend;the share of net changes
3However, the consumpLion ofconsumers' (lurable commodities isnot allowed for. It is productionnet of such consumptioti that should be in-
cluded in net capital formation.
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in claims against foreign countries, negative and minor be-
fore the first World War, became positive and substantial
thereafter, especially in net capital formation.
6) In consumers' outlay the largest component of the
four is the flow of perishable commodities, which accounts
for 40-50 per cent; the next largest is the value of services
not embodied in new commodities (rent, direct personal
and professional services, direct payments by individuals to
governments, repairs and servicing of consumers' durable I
and of residential housing, etc.). which accounts for 30-35
per cent (Table 6). Semidurable commodities constitute
about 15 per cent, and consumers' durable, somewhat less
than one-tenth, on the average. But here again we find
marked changes in the composition of consumers' outlay.
In 1929 prices the share of perishable commodities declines
from about o to about 40 per cent. That of consumers'
durable almost doubles (from about 6 per cent in the early
decades it rises to well over to in the later). The share of
seTvices not embodied in new commodities seems toincrease
slightly, hut the samples of expenditures on which our
assumptions are based are scattered and rather inadequate.
The share of semidurable commodities remains about the
same.
This summary necessarily omits several observations that
scrutiny of the estimates suggests. It does not mention the
rate of growth in national product, capitalformation, and
consumers' outlay in the pastin the totals, per capita, or in
measures per some other population unit; or therather in-
teresting suggestion that changes in the rate at which con-
sumers' outlay and capital formation grew are inversely
related during most of the period, especially in the early
decades preceding the first World War. But all we need say
here is that in 1929 prices national product, capital forma-
tion, and consumers' outlay increase from one decade to an-
other; that national product declines only during thelast
Idecade, It)29-38; that consumers' outlay does not decline at
all, even in the last decade; and that capital formation de-
clines beginning with the decade 1924-33.
Some of the long term trends are in line with expecta-
tions and can be explained easily. The decline in the share
of construction and the rise in the share of producers' dur-
able goods reflect the building up of our basic housing and
industrial systems and the shift of emphasis to machinery
and equipment. The reversal of the sign and the increase in
net changes in claims against foreign countries reflect the
shift in this country's position from an international debtor
to a creditor, in the past a usual corollary of a country's at-
taininent of industrial maturity. The shift in consumers'
outlay toward consumers' durable commodities and services
not embodied in new commodities is a natural concomitant
of a rising standard of living. Not only did the share ofcon-
sinners' durable commodities increase but themore dispen-
sable goods came to dominate: outlay onpassenger cars and
radios grew faster than outlay on furniture. There isno
need to discuss these trends; we merely note them for future
reference.
But two observations are relevant at themoment. First,
in no past decade has net capital formation exceeded15
per cent of national income (in 1929 prices); and in onlyone
(1889-98) did it exceed 14 per cent. Ofcourse, for single
years or pairs of years during tile period before i 919 this
share may have been higher than theaverage (12 per cent).
But since 1919, the one period for whichwe have annual
estimates, in only two years was it slightly over 15per cent;
and in no period of more than twoyears did it average over
i or 12 per cent (Table 8). The smallness of the share of
capital formation in national income has obvious implica-
tions in an emergency such as thepresent. We should there-
fore try to explain why the share is not larger.
Second, the ratio of capital formationto the national
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aproduct has been stable. Except during the periods affected
by the severe depression of 1929-32, when the decade aver-
ages even of the national product declined, the share of
capital formation in national income fluctuates from decade
to decade, largely because of the prevalence of long cycles
in construction, but shows no definite trend either upward
or downward. The decade shares of gross capital formation
in gross national product are similarly devoid of a long term
movement. Why, in view of the consistent and large increase
in real product per capita, should there be such secular
stability in the division of the national product between
consumers' outlay and capital formation? Why, with a gain
in income per capita, did not the propensity to consume
weaken and that to save become stronger, increasing the
share of capital formation in the national product? What
mechanism served to enlarge consumption pan possu with
the growth in the national products thereby maintaining
the relative shares of consumption and investment?
Let us consider this mechanism in studying today's
problems. Apparently, the factors that explain the secular
stability explain also the limits upon the absolute size of
the share of capital formation in national income. We
therefore deal first with the factors that tended to produce
secular stability in the division of national income between
consumers' outlay and capital formation; then indicate their
bearing upon why such a small fraction was left for capital
formation.
THE FACTORS IN SECULAR STABILITY
We list some of the more important factors that make for
larger consumers' outlay per capita, indicate those that con-
tribute to a rise in capital formation pan passu with the rise
in national product, and describe the mechanism that serves
to align these groups of factors so that neither consumers'
outlay nor capital formation grows faster than total national
9
.product. But the explanation is tentativeand is offered
chiefly in the way of suggestions.
i) 'I'Iie factors that made for largerconsumers' outlay
per capita concurrent ivith a mounting nationalproduct
per capita seem to be as follows.
First, some of the conditions inducingor accompanying
the growth in national productper capita depended upon
and called for larger outlays byultimate consumers. For
example. the close Connection betweenscientific progress,
personal skill, and a sustainedrate of economic progress
meant a demand for more extensive andintensive educa-
tion. But moneyspent on education is part ofconsumers'
outlay. The large growth inthe proportion of urban
(Iwellers, a corollary of the increasingindustrialization that
gave the basis for a sustained increase innational product
per capita, imposed uponmore and more people livingcon-
ditions whose discomfortcould be lessened only byaddi-
tional expenditureson items included underconsumers'
outlay. The increasing divisionof labor and complexityof
the economic system, withthe need for moreregulation,
were consequences of thevery factors that made for the
rapid growth of nationalincome; and they calledfor a
larger consumers' outlay,specifically thoseparts that were
in compensation for theservices of regulating publicand other agencies.
Second, technicalprogress influences the productionnot
only of capital goods butalso of finishedconsumers' goods and the demandpatterns of ultimate consumers. Thus,tech-
nological innovation, whichcontributed to the increase in
output per capita, served, bystimulating demand fornew pro(lucts or for improved oldones, to enlarge consumers'
outlay; or more precisely,contributed to a greaterpotential demand forconsumer goods. Even a hastyglance at the
make-tip of consumers'outlay in recent decadeswill mdi-
&:ate how large a portion of itis commodities andservices that are distinctly resultsof modern technologyand of rela-
I0
Stively recent technological innovations.4 Among the perish-
able are certain drugs and toilet preparations and gasoline;
among the semidurable, tires and tubes and certain types
of housefurnishings; among consumers' durable, electrical
household appliances and supplies, radios, passenger cars,
etc.; among services not embodied in new commodities,
services o. professional practitioners vastly superior to
those in the past, repair services in connection with the new
types of consumers' durable goods, and the like. Inshort,
technological progress has stimulated individual and house-
hold demand for more and different consumer goods as well
as brought pressure for more roundabout methodsof pro-
duction and hence for more capital formation.
Urbanization and changes in the economic status and age
structure of the population suggest other factors contribu-
tory to a greater average consumption per capita. As popu-
lation moved from the country to the city, and especially as
the proportion of independent proprietors of unincorpo-
rated businesses declined and that of wage and salary em-
ployees rose, there was more exposure to the attractions of a
high-level consumption pattern and less drive to save in
order to accumulate capital for the expansion of one's own
business. These factors may have gone a long way toward
offsetting any potentially depressive effects of a larger in-
come per capita upon the propensity to consume orits
expansive effects on the propensity to save. In addition, the
relative gain in the number of younger adults meant that
the secular increase in the number of both producing and
consuming units was greater than in the total population.
inducing larger consumers' outlay per capita; and that the
secular increase in national product per consuming unit
was, therefore, smaller than in product percapita.
2) There are also obvious factors that tended to sustain
4 See the analysis of the output of manufactured prod(uts in 1879 and i 88q
and in 1929 and 1939 by W. H. Shaw in Finishcd Conmiodities since i8
(Occasional Paper 3, Aug. 194'). pp. 12-3.
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capital formation, preventing a secular decline in its share,
at least up to the 1920's. First, since two large components
of capital formation, residential construction and the con-
struction of associated utilities serving consumers directly,
are part and parcel of the pattern of ultimate consumption,
an increase in the latter would necessarily mean an increase
in the former. Second, other components of capital forma-
tion consist oE capital invested directly in the production
of finished consumer goods. Any increase in the latter would
tend to keep up the production of such capital,even were
there no technological changes that would requirea larger
capital investment per unit of finished product. Third,
technological innovations may create a demand fornew
capital, even beyond the increase called for bygreater con-
sumers' outlay.
3) We do not know enough about the factors that make
for larger consumers' outlayas against those that make for
increased capital formation to demonstrate how and why
their combined influence kept their shares in the national
product stable from i88o to 1920 (or 1930). Butwe point
out the close interrelation of the factors that swell theper
capita amounts of both components and the closeinterde-
pendence of these components in thesense that an increase
in one tends to cause an increase in the other. Thesebonds
of common factors making for expansion and forinterde-
pendence at least suggest why the relative sharesof con-
sumers' outlay and capital formation tend towardsecular
stability, unless a major technical changetemporarily em-
phasizes the expansion of consumption,as it did in the
1920's via demand for passengercars; or unless an extraordi-
narily severe depression cuts ttLe growth oftile national
product sharply and thusserves to augment the share of the
component more resistant to Contraction, viz., consumers'
outlay.
Moreover, certain features of tile distributionof national
income made for stability in the relativeshares of consump-
12tion and real investment or savings, at least during the
period with which we are concerned. In general, almost all
the monetary equivalent of national income is distributed
in the form of payments to ultimate consumers. The share
of national income retained by enterprises during i 919-28
was quite small (about 5 per cent); during 1929-38It was
negative.5 In the earlier decades it was probably not much,
if at all, larger.
In the total flow of current means of payment to ultimate
consumers the relative shares of service income payments
(the sum of employee compensation and withdrawals of
entrepreneurs' incomes) and of property income payments
(dividends, interest, and rent, including or excluding sav-
ings of enterprises) in national income also show over tile
same long period marked secular stability (Table). As the
net income originating in an industry grows, the continu-
ous pressure of the employed and gainfullyattached to get
their share causes a tendency toward stability in the share
of service income payments within the industry. While in
some industries this share may shrink becauseproportion-
ately more money is invested in fixed capital and property
(as rapid technical progress requires greater investment in
fixed capital than in direct costs), in other industries the
reverse may occur; and there may be acompensating in-
crease in the relative weight in the national economyof in-
dustries with a higher than average ratio of service income
payments to net income originating. Secular stability inthe
shares of service and property income payments, in turn,
suggests secular persistence in the degree of inequalityin
the distribution of income by size among recipient units,
such as individuals and families; and such persistence is at
least not belied by what little historical evidence we have.6
See National income and Its Conposition, Table 22, I, 216-8 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1941).
6 Stability in the relative shares of service and property income in national
income removes only one [actor that might have made for changes in the
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This, in turn, suggests temporalstability in the shares of
consumption and savings in income; and thussuggests, in
terms of the disposal ofmeans of payment, the secular
stability that was observed inthe division of the real prod-
uct between consumers' outlay and capitalformation.
To repeat, the explanationsubmitted above is highly
tentative and can hardly claimto have even mentioned all
the factors involved. It israther a list of suggestions why, for
the period studied, thereseems to be secular persistenceiii
the share of capital formationin the national product,sug-
gestions that needcorroboration by more specific evidence.
Especially shouldwe resist the temptation to infer thatsuch
secular stability'tllnecessarily continue. On thecontrary,
it is more prokible that,as in some more fully industrialized
countries, the share of capitalformation may decline,a ten-
dency especiallyprobable if we considerdomesticcapital
formation alone and excludeinvestments abroad.
If thesearguments explain to some extent whythe rela-
tive shares of capitalformation andconsumers' outlay were
stable secularly, theycontribute also to an understanding,if
not to an adequate explanation,of why the share ofnet
capital formation isso moderate. First, theaccount above of
the factors that make fora concurrent rise over time incon-
sumers' outlay and capitalformation indicates alsothat at
any given moment the divisionof national income between
the two component is theend product of a variety offorces,
some of which tend to make fora large share of consumers'
outlay and others fora large share of capital formation.
That the end product isa relatively moderate share of capi-
(note 6 concl.)
inequality in the distributionof income by size. It doesnot preclude the possibility that other factors, suchas differences between avcragcincome Irons service and property, thedegree of inequality in the size(listributiolis of service or ofproperty income, each group takc,iseparately, may have changed so as to affect the sizedistribution of intomeansung ultimate recipients.
14tat formation must obviously betraceable to the expansi-
bility of consumers' wants; to adecisive preference of human
beings endowed with a limited life spanfor present satis-
factions over future in an uncertainworld; and to the
necessarily limited stream of investmentopportunities
whose prospective net returnswould be sufficiently great
to outweigh the preference onthe part of income recipients
for present satisfactions.
Second, if, as our estimates show. thedivision of national
income between consumers' outlayand capital formation
remained secularly stable during thefour decades that pre-
ceded the 1920'S (and somepreliminary estimates suggest
that it was about the sameduring a fifth decade, that of the
1870's), the reason that the share ofcapital formation was
not more than about iper cent lies in the economicsitua-
tion prevailing four or fivedecades before the 1920 S. Since
we are not in aposition to analyze that situation we cannot
demonstrate why this shareshould have been 15 rather than
20 or 30 per cent.Possibly with the level of national product
per capita thatprevailed in the 1870's and i88o's and with
the free competitive systemexisting then, it was not feasible
to devote more thanone-seventh of national income to pur-
poses other than directultimate consumption. At any rate,
the relatively small share ofcapital formation in national
income seems more plausible whenit is traced back to the
earlier decades in this country'sgrowth decades marked by
per capita incomemuch lower than at presents than when
one attempts to seethe reason for it during recent years,
marked as they were by such highlevels of per capita
income.
Both arguments are merelysuggestions that indicate in
what directions one must seek anadequate explanation of
the relatively small share of capitalformation in national in-
come. Tile explanationitself could be attained only by dint
of elaborate further study, beyond the scopeof this paper.
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BEARiNG UPON THE PRESENT EMERGENCY
The record of the past indicates that with a rapid growth in
national product per capita, the interdependence ofcon-
sumers' outlay and capital formation meant a Continuous
growth in both; that the share of capital formation in
national product did not grow with the productper capita;
and that net capital formation constituted notmore than
15per cent of national income. In contrast, the various plans
for war outlay now envisage diverting40or50per cent of
national income from immediate consumption by individ-
uals and families.
The estimates quoted for the past relate to decadesand,
of course, to the performance of theeconomy under more
or less normal economic conditions, while the plans forwar
outlay are Predicated for a period much shorterthan a
decade and arc for a situation in which significantdepar-
tuies from the ordinary functioning of economic andsocial
institutions can and will be made. But obviousas this com-
ment is, let us consider what these peculiar circumstancesof
the emergency may mean ifa greater proportion of a mount-
ing national income is diverted fromimmediate consunip-
tion.
First, there is the divorce betweennet capital formation
and consumers' outlay. The connectionbetween the two,
so close in the secular development of theeconomy and so
instrumental in giving secular stabilityto their relative
shares, is broken by an entirelynew stimulus to diversion
from ultimate consumption. Towhat extent this entailsa
complete shift of net capital formationto war purposes and
away from servicing industries concerned withconsumers'
outlay depends partlyupon mobility of resources, partly
upon how long the war lasts. Ifwe provisionally make the
most extreme assumption, namely, that forthe duration no
new capital formation will take placeexcept that directly
relevant to and part of thewar outlay, about15per cent of
national income can be turnedto war production.
i6But should we not consider gross rather than net capital
formation? It is gross capital formation that measures the
value of all finished machinery, equipment, new construc-
tion, net additions to inventories, net changes in claims
against foreign countries, the sum of which is the value of
finished products diverted from ultimate consumption. The
charge for depreciation and obsolescence, the difference be-
tween gross and net capital formation, does not measure
actual retirement or destruction of existing capital goods:
a substantial part measuresthe opportunity cost of keeping
machinery, etc. instead of replacing it with technically more
advanced and newer equipment. In times of emergency
such opportunity cost may be, temporarily, quite low,and
we may claim that the fullvalue of all capital formation,
gross of depreciation and obsolescence, canbe diverted to
war outlay. If the emergency isrelatively short, such a view
is tenable since failure to replace does not necessarily entail
reduction in the productive capacity even of that peacetime
part of the industrial system whose cunent additions to re-
placement funds have been absorbed into war production.
Therefore, gross rather than net capital formation should
be considered in estimating how much can be diverted from
direct or indirect use for ultimate consumption. In the past,
it constituted, at best, about one-fourth of gross national
product. But it is a higher percentage of national income,
since gross national product has recently averaged some 1 12
per cent of national income(for the prosperous decade
1919-28; the ratio would be higher for the 1930'S). Gross
capital formation is about 28 per cent of national income
under conditions approximating the prosperous past;and
this is the percentage that can be diverted, again assuming
full mobility of resources and a brief emergency.7
7War outlays are usually calculated gross. and when comparedwith
national income the comparison is essentially of gross quantitieswith net.
Hence gross capital formation can be considered the proper componentin
war outlays. When we compare it withnational income (rather than with
17$
But the assumptions under which thispercentage was de-
rived are manifestly uurea I istic. The basic qualification is
that productive resources usedto turn out pea:ctime capital
goods may, when (livefledto the production of war instru-
ments, yield a significantly higheror lower gross value
product. The complex ofraw materials, machinery, and
labor used to producea truck, a locomotive, or a typewriter,
may when used (with sonie adjustments)to turn out a tank
or a set of torpedo parts, yield a higheror lower gross value
of finished products: theraw materials may be used more
or less economically; the machinerymay find, upon conver-
sion, a more or lessproductive use; labor may be applied
more or less efficiently. These changes inproductivity are
not clearly taken into account in theusual assumption of
constant price levels: the changesare not in prices of identi-
cal goods, but in the technicalconditions of production that
make labor, machinery,and sometimes evenraw materials
not quite comparable as betweencivilian and waruse.
Similar considerations applyto the discussion below, when
we treat of the possible diversion fromthe output ofcon-
(note 7 coneL)
gross national product) we are followingthe procedure usual in discussions of scat outlays, although itmay lead to absurd results, since underit war outla)s lisay exceesi Isatioflal income.
(;ross capital formationas measure(l here is net of repairsand mnainte- nailce; and it mas be argued that duringshort periods ofemergency, out- lays on repair and maintenancemay also be reduced and the realresources imIvolSesI 'liSericti to waruses. The estimates, for public utilitiesand gov- erunmenmal capital (highways andsewers), iiidkame an outlain these areas alomie of roughly S3 billionin 192q (see Solomofl Fabricant,Capital Con- snot tum and .-ldjusme,:t NationalBureau of Economic Research,t8, rable 31, pp. 170-I). And it isreasonal,le to assume that the totalmainte- tia lice and 1-cpa ithi II. as dust inct from depreciationand depletion charges, might1101111t in prosperous years to betweenansI 7 per cent of the IiamjonjI iiiconst. No ahlowa,leehas been niade in thesljsctissjo,i bclw for (li%eISjon from this source, sifleeit seemed doubtful that,with the strain tiliposestIlpoti di. rahic coninsoshi tiesa us] strurt ores by aIi igher rate of utilizatiOn during the emergency.much retluctiomi in therepairs and main- tenaitce outlay could be expected.sumer goods to war production: this diversionagain means
a marked break in the technicalcoefficients of production.
And while the possible differences in the yield of complexes
of productive factors as between peace and war uses tend to
be kept within limits (under assumption of constant prices)
by the continuity of identity of these factors in the process of
transition, there may nevertheless be sizable differences.
Unfortunately, we cannot take account of them quantita-
tively; and for the diversion from both gross capital forma-
tion and consumers' outlay we are forced to assume that the
productive resources that yielded, in peacetime use, a billion
dollars' worth of final products (in 1941 prices) will yield,
when turned to war production, a value product not too far
from $i billion (in 1941 prices).
But the assumptions are also unrealistic in the sense that
complete diversion of gross capital tcmation to war uses is
predicated. Two factors make such a co'nplete transfer un-
likely. First, diversion of capital formation, which has
been so closely tied to the production of peacetime goods,
into essentially different channels within a short time as-
sumes mobility of resources; yet resoufces aremobile only
over relatively long periods. If theperiod is long, however,
failure to replace capital goods or to add to their stock may
seriously curtail the capacity of the system devoted to the
production of the consumer goods we cannot do without.
Hence, in thinking of a brief emergency, we must assume
that some of the resources ordinarily devoted to private
capital formation would continue so. And in considering a
long emergency, we must allow for some private capital re-
placement and additions to assure the productionof what-
ever consumer goods seemessential.
Second, the very increase in production for war purposes
assumes bigger demand for some nonwarcapital formation.
unless we include under war production not onlycommodi-
ties and services directly utilized in war but also allgoods
involved at second, third, fourth, etc., remove. If more tanks
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are produced and a bigger supply of steel is called for; and
this bigger snpply of steel calls for new steel capacity, which
in turn calls for more construction and therefore for more
bricks, do we consider the manufacture of bricks war pro-
duction and include its full value under war outlay? Obvi-
ously, if we carry our classification of goods as war goods too
far, war outlay encompasses almost all economic produc-
tion. And if we confine war outlay to the cost of finalwar
goods and perhaps the capital goods immediately involved,
nonwar capital formation (gross or even net) may be the
prerequisite for the development of the war effort on the
scale assumed.
What share of national income will be claimed bynonwar
capital formation, i.e., cannot be transferred towar effort
or cannot be dispensed with during the emergency, we can
only conjecture. Perhaps some idea of the rock-bottom levels
to which this ratio can descend can be formed from theex-
perience of the severe depression of the 1930's. Duringits
worst years,1932and 1933, the ratio of gross capital forma-
tion to national income was between7 and 8 per cent; and
its ratio to estimated depreciation and depletioncharges
during these years was between42 and 48 per cent (Table
8). Neither is an adequate baseon which to judge the irre-
ducible minimum of nonwar capital formationthat must
be allowed for. Eight per cent of the largenational income
of today and tomorrowmeans much more in terms of the
relative replacement of capital goods than8 per cent of the
small national income produced in1932 and '933; and it
may therefore be argued that such an allowance forthe
minimum ratio of nonwar capital formationto national in-
come is too generous. On the other hand, total depreciation
charges do not measure either retirementor incentives for
nonwar capital formation: such incentivesare better re-
flected in the size of the nationalincome and, even for
nonwar capital formation, are likely to bestronger during
a war economy than during the troughyears of a severe de-
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.pression. First, we assume that the indispensable minimum
of nonwar capital formation is 8 per cent of national in-
come; then, we make the more moderate assumption that
it is 40 per cent of the depreciation and depletion charges.8
These crude calculations suggest that if war outlays are
to exceed one-fifth of national income, we must, even on the
assumption that all except an irreducible minimum of capi-
tal formation is transferred to war purposes, think of paring
down the share of consumers' outlay in national income.
But how much the reduction will be and what it will mean
in the way of scrimping consumption can be clearly visual-
ized only if consumers' outlay is measured absolutely (rather
than as a percentage of national income) and related to the
number of consuming units. We must, therefore, posit some
level of national income and some number of consuming
units during the emergency.
Let us take as a reasonable guess an annual national in-
come for the war years of about$105billion in 1041 prices.
The latest estimate of national income for i 941 suggests a
level of about $billion; and the assumption would thus
mean a substantial relative increase in 1942 over 1941. Yet
the guess may be on the low side even for 1942, if we take
into account the recent rate of expansion of the national
product and include under national income, in the calcula-
tion of governmental net savings, the accumulation of all
assets including planes, tanks, ammunition, etc. (a proce-
8On the basis of the national income total assumed below, nonwar capital
formation estimated at 8 per cent of the former amounts to $g.8 billion (in
iag prices) while depreciation and depletion charges are1o.5billion. If
such irreducible nonwar capital formation is assumed to be io per cent of
depreciation and depletion charges, its annual amount is $..a billion. In
prosperous times in the past, gross capital formation (preponderantly and
overwhelmingly noitwar in character) amountedto 28per cent of national
income, and for a national income of$122.1billion (in1929prices) would
be $4 billion. The 'high' assumption for nonwar capital formation (Itiring
war years. therefore, means a reduction to between one-third and one-
quarter of a presumptive peacetime amount; the 'low' assumption, a reduc-
tion to about one-eighth of the latter.
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dure refused by the logic of the analysis at hand). For 1943
and 1944 a level of national income of $105 billion in 1941
prices may be even more of an under-estimate. Yet we pre-
ferred to proceed on the more conservative assumption, and
based our illustrative calculations on this level. Since the
average cost of living index in 1941 was 86 per cent of that
ifl 1929, the assumed national income is, in 1929 prices,
roughly $122.1 billion.
Our discussion has been based UOfl a ratio of net capital
formation to national income of 15 per cent; this leaves
about $103.8 billion (in 1929 prices) for consumers' outlay.
Consuming units for these two or three waryears may be
roughly estimated to be ioomillion.9If the share of con-
sumers' outlay in national income remained thesame, out-
lay per consuming unit during thewar years (say 1942-44)
would average some $1,038 in i 929prices, a consumption
level much higher than that prevailing during1929-38
($7III 1929 prices, see Table 10); and even higher than
those for 1938 and 1929($giand $88o respectively in
1929prices).10This conclusion is obvious, basedas it is
upon calculations that transfer to consumers' outlay the full
relative increase in national income caused byan extraor-
dinary expansion of war production.
What percentage of nationalincome could be diverted
to war purposes if, instead of allowing consumers'outlay
to grow with national income,we kept outlay per con-
suming unit at prewar levels? Ifwe assume that outlay per
consuming unit remains at theaverage level of 1929-38 (i.e.,
$757in 1929 prices), consumers' outlay during thewar years
would amount to$75.7billion. This wouldmean a ratio of
0 From 95.8 million in i8 they havebeen assumed to increase at a rate of
about o.g million per year. the rate for theYears preceding 1938 (see National
Income and Its Composition, Table 8, 1. 151). Intranslating population to
consuming units we weight age and sexgroups by their consumption needs.
For the scales used see W. S. Thompson andP. K. Whelpton, Pop tdation
Trends in the United Stales, Tablep. 169 (McGraw-Hill, ig).
10 National Income and Ils Composition,Table io, 1, i6.
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Iwar outlay to nationalincotite ofg per centestimated as
follows: consumers' outlay and art 8 per cent(of national
income) allowance for nonwar capitalformation will be
$7.7 + $9.8 = $85.5billion; allowance for capital con-
sumption roughly $10.5 billion in 1929prices,'1 added to
the national income we assume,yields a gross national prod-
uct of $132.6 billion; thediversion for war purposes is
then the difference between$132.6 and $85.5 billion, or
i billion. If we assumethat outlay per consuming unit
remains at the 1938 level, consumers'outlay during the war
years would amount to$79.1 billion, and the ratio of war
outlay to national income would be36 per cent.'2
It would seem then that in order toattain a war outlay
equal to 40 per cent of the national income we assume,con-
sumers' outlay per unit can hemaintained or pruned mod-
erately. But if the desideratum is ao per cent ratio the
picture changes: annual consumers'outlay would l)e re-
duced to $61.7 billion, or $617 perconsuming unit.'3 A
glance at Table i o indicates that $6i7 per consuimllgunit is
substantially higher than the level for any pre-1919decade,
but it is 19 per cent lower than in1919-28 or 1929-38, and
22 per cent lower thanin 1938. On the 'low' assumption for
nonwar capital formation, adiversion of 50 per cent of
national income to war outlay wouldadmit of a consumers'
11 Based upon a rough extrapolation of the estimateof capital consumption
in the National Bureau's study of capitalformation. For 1939 this estimate
puts capital consumption at $j.6 billion(in 1929 prices).
12 On the 'low' assumption for nonwar capitalformation, a maintenalsce of
consumers' outlay at the 1938 level wouldadmit of a ratio of war outlay to
national income of 40 per cent; and the maintenanceof the consumers' out-
lay level of 1929-38, a ratio of war outlay tonational income of 4per cent.
13 The President's budget message to Congress onJanuary 7, 1912 mentiOns
national defense outlays for the fiscal year of52.8 billion (presumably
in ii prices), or about one-half of thenational income we assume will
prevail during the war years. Of course, itmight be coiitended that given
such an outlay, national income couldexceed the level assumed here, in





outlay per unit of $673 (in1929prices), and thus call fora
reduction of iiper cent from the consumers' outlay level
of '929-38,of 15 percent from the1938level.
This reduction from the levelof1929-38(or1938)does
not mean that consumers' expenditureswould be reduced
by the sameamount; for consumers' outlay per unit,as
usually estimated, includespayments to governments, some
of which are for militarypurposes and others are for func-
tions that can be shiftedto war production without affecting
the supply of goods andservices to ultimateconsumers. For
example, if x per cent ofconsumers' expendituresare for
taxes of various types included inthe cost of the goodsto
ultimate consumers, and if innormal times one-tenth of
these tax receiptsare spent for military purposes andan-
other tenth for functionsthat can be shifted towar produc-
tion without deprivingultimate consumers of important
governmental services, then O.2xper cent of consumers'
outlay can be added forPotential war USCS withoutper-
ceptibly reducingconsumers' outlay per capita.
The item is not large. Militaryexpenditures by govern-
men ts in this country havenot constituted a highpercentage
of national income (onthe average not muchmore than 1
or 2 per cent, if we exclude suchtransfer outlays asveterans'
pensions). The substantivefunctions of governmental
agencies, so faras they do not contribute to capitalforma-
tion, cannot easily be abridgedwithout curbing the flow of
goods and services toultimate consumers; andthose func-
tions that give riseto capital formation have alreadybeen
assumed to be divertedto war purposes. Thus,even though,
according to recent estimates,taxes included in thecost of
consumers' expendituresamounted to as muchas i8 per
cent of the latter, it is doubtfulthat more than2 per cent of
national incomecan be added on thisaccount to what can
potentially be diverted to nationaldefense. With this addi-
tion, per unit outlay byconsumers, on the assumptions
made, would haveto be pruned to some $641to assure a
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diversion of one-half ofnational income to warpurposes.14
The meaning ofparing consumers' outlay per unitdown
to an averageabout i6 per cent lower thanduring 1919-28
and roughly 19 per centlower than in 1938 can begrasped
only by analyzingdifferential effects upon groupsof con-
sumers and typesof goods. which we are notin a position to
do here. Yet threeconsiderations are obvious.
First. groups that, in morenormal times, live close to the
subsistence level, cannotspend much less. In 1935-36,of all
American families 41.6 per centreceived incomes of $i3O00
or lessand averaged considerablyless than $i ,000 of con-
sumers' outlay perfamily.15 Even if we assume thatonly
one-third of Americanfamilies had such small incomes,the
bulk of the reductionin consumers' outlaywould still have
to be borneby two-thirds of the consumersin the country.
Furthermore, the chiefexpenditures (on food, clothing,and
housing) of thoseconsuming units that jointhe armed
forces cannot be cut.And while some will comefrom the
one-third of families near thesubsistence level, the restwill
come fromfamilies that would notsuffer if they spent less
on consumergoods. If we assume anarmed force ofmil-
lion, about 3.3 millionof whom are from suchfamilies, no
reduction in consumers'outlay can be expectedfor about 2
million units (million weighted by the62 per cent allow-
ance for food,clothing, and housing).'6The i6 to 19 per
14Two per cent of nationalincome would amount to$2.4billion (in 19
prices), or $244 per consumingunit; which, added to the$617 derived above,
would raise outlay per consumingunit to $61. On the'low' assumption [or
nonwar capital formation,outlay per consuming unitunder condiLions in-
dicated in the text would be $67. areduction of12per cent froni thei8
level-
15See ConsumerExpenditure5in the Unild States(National Resources
Committee, WashingtOn. '939)'Table i,p.20.
16It might be argued. as we wereinclined to do in an earlierversion ol this
paper, that expendituresfor consumer goods bythe armed forces is a part
of war outlay; then wecould merely include this partof consumption under
war outlay, therebyincreasing the share ofnational income devoted to war
purposes without reducingthe per capita outlay ofcivilian consumers. The
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cent of over-all reduction inconsumers' outlay perunit
wouldmean a reduction of some20 to 22 per cent per unit
for the consumergroups able to bear the burden ofcon-
traction in nonwarproduction.T
Second, because of thestickiness of resources andbecause
some goods are more essentialthan others inwar produc-
(note i6 conri.)
logical fallacy of suchtreatment is revealed if we apply thesame reasoning to workers employed ina factory producing munitions:would we include their expenditureson consumer goods underwar outlay? l'lie latter buy consumer goods with moneyreceived from thegovernment; the former receive consumer goods thathave been purchased by thegovernment. The crux of thematter is chat war outlayincludesthe value of the services of the armed forcesas well as the value of capitalgoods produced for waging war (the latterembodying the services of workerseznploye(l in munitions Factories). IVemay and do estimate the value ofthe services of the armed forcesat the value of theirSubsIstcc and salary. But defense outlay excludes both thevalue of the services of thearmed forces and their subsistence consumption, justas it excludes both the valueof the services of workers in munitionsfactories and theirconsunserc' outlay. Greaterwar outlay meansconsumption of the services ofmore armed forces (notem- bodied in commodities)and of other employees(some embodied incom- modities. others not);and consumers' outlay,not a part of war outlay,must be calculated on theassumption that it sustains allconsumers in the country, whether in theaz-med forces or elsewhere.
17Based on the relationshipof the consumptionexpenditures of the upper two-thirds to those of thelowest third ofconsumer units (Consunjer Ex- Penditures in th UnitedStates, Table 6.p.o). For i g-6expenditures on consumption itemswere $1,056, and$2,212for the lowest, middle. and upper third,respectis.ely; the averagewas $I,27. For outlay per consuming unitws $765. 11, for thewar years, we assume thatthe relation of theaverage for the middle andupper thirds to that for the
lowest third is at themg-level 550 or2.97),st-c
x + 2 (2.97x) get....._.___._..... 765.The outlay of the lowestthird is$i,and oF the upper two-thirds,$985. Assumingno reduction for the loucestthird, theupper two.thirds must beara reduction of one-fifthin order to bring the average downto $641.
On the 'low'assumption for nonwar capitalformation, the reductionus per tinit outlay by theconsuming groups thatare able to hear thecontrac- tion would amountto 10 per cent of theiroutlay in z919-aSand 14 per cent of their outlay in 1938.tion, an over-allreduction in consumers' outlay cannot be
divided either proportionately or atthe discretion of the
ultimate consumersthemselves among the various types ot
finished goods. It would bemuch easier for ultimate con-
sumers if they weretold that the over-all reduction intheir
outlay should be suchand such, and then were left free to
choose which items theywould forego or use less freely.
Instead, expenditures oncertain types of finished goods
must be curtaileddrastically, whereas others may remain
the same; i.e., the whole structureof consumers' budgets is
affected.
Yet in this specific emergencythere is an important miti-
gating circumstance. Thedemands of war production seem
to be concentrated ongoods from industries thatproduce
chiefly durable commoditiesfor ultimate consumption (air-
planes automotiveequipmeflt electrical appliancesradios,
etc.). ConseqUefltlY wardemands for productive capacity
and materials fall mostheavily upon industries that pro-
duce goods in whichconsumers' inventories tend tobe
large, in which a short termshortage is likely to meanlittle
privatiofl and in which even along term restriction of
supply is not likely toimpair seriously the well-beingof
ultimate consumers.18
Finally it is altogether too easy to say, aswe did, that with
the steady growth inultimate consumption perunit, levels
prevailing during the yearsimmediately preceding the
emergency weremuch higher than only adecade or two
before; and that evencutting ultimate consumption one-
18 This concentration of warproduction in the technologically younger
industries, which may still have arelatively large backlog oftechnical
changes and are therefore subject tothe law of increasing returns. may
counteract any tendencies inproductivity to decline because of hastychanges
in plant operations from peace to warneeds, shortages in materialand
services, dilution of labor skill,and other corollaries of a rapidlyexpanding
war effort. It may influencethe postwar development ofthe economy tre-
mendously, because the technologicalimprovements inthese iounger
industries during the war may provide abase for wide postwarexpansion
of demand for their products.










But we have suggestedthat in an emergency such as the
present. diversion ofnational income to war production
must be predicate(l uponsubstantial contraction of both
private capital formation andconsumers' outlay; and that
both mean drastic changesin the social institutions and
customs that havegoverned the growth of national income
and its division betweenconsumers' outlay and capital for-
mation. Our task today isradically different from those
solved by this country's economic systemfrom i88o through
igo. We cannotattain the diversion thought desirable
without disrupting the customary patternof economic
activity. Prompt and decisiveaction is imperative to ease
the pain of thedislocations inevitable in any attempt to
direct capital formation into newchannels, breaking the
long established connectionbetween capital investment and
consumption needs of ultimate consumers;to overcome
resistance to any extraordinaryincrease in the share of
national income to be diverted fromimmediate consump-
tion. It is also clear that the warwill leave a huge heritage
of departures from the secular patternof development; and
that the satisfaction ofneglected needs and unfulfilled wants
will dominate the processesof consumption and capital
formation in the early phases of the postwarperiod.
The Estimates and TheirDerivation 19
SOURCES OF TABLES 1-7
ANNUAL ESTIMATES of grossand net capital formation and
of their components as well asthe sources and methods, for
years beginning with igiwere published inCommodity
19 The derivation of the decade estimatesof commodity flow, capital forma-
tion, and national product will bepublished in more detail, probably in
Technical Paper.Mr. Shaw's basic and detailedestimates of finished
commodities are being assembled, andwill. we hope. be published in a
monograph this year.
29Flow and CapitalFormal ion Vol. One(National Bureau of
Economic Researcjl, 1938),and in Bulletin74. Commodity Flow and CapitalFormation in the RecentRecovery and
Decline, '932-1938 (June25,1939). These estimateshave been revised inmerely minorrespects. The estimates of
national income forthe last two decadesare described in detail in NationalIncome and ItsComposition, 1919-1938
(National Bureau ofEconomic Research,1941). They area series that was revisedslightly for publicationin thatreport but Since thechanges were minorthe original serieswas re- tained here.
For conveniencewe discuss tile estimates forthe earlier decades (used inTables 1-7) underseven headings.
a) Finishedcommodities
The flow, bygroups, was derived fromestimates of the value, at producers'prices, of finishedcommodities destined for domesticconsumption, prepared byWilliam H. Shaw
TABLEI




































'0.827 13.5at the NationalBureau. The estimates are based upon a
study of the successive censuses of manufactures, mines, and
agriculture supplemented by state and other data for inter-
censal years; of statistics of exports and imports; and ofvari-
ous data onwholesale prices in order to express values
in both current and constant prices. Theprocedures are
fairly similar to those used for recent years anddescribed in
Commodity Flow and Capital Formation, Vol. One. Mr.
Shaw's estimates, published in Occasional Paper 3(Aug.
1941), are, however, for producers' valises and do notallow
for transportation and distribution costs, orfor the diver-
sion of current output into inventories. Inorder to pass
from Mr. Shaw's estimates to estimatesof the flow to ulti-
mate consumers, at cost tothem, we have assumed that for
each of the four commodity groups, theratio of transporta-
tion and distribution costs to producers'values was in the
earlier decades the same as during 1919-33;the ratio of net
flow to inventories to total outputdestined for domestic
TABLE 2
Net National Product (National Income)and
Net Capital Formation per Year, byDecades,
(columns i,,,and 5 in millions of dollars)
CURRENT PRICES 1929I'RICES
Net Net % () Net Net %(rj)
nationalcapital isof nationalcapitalisol















(1) (2) () (.) (r)
1879-1888 10,310 1,073 10.4 15,175 1,766
1884-1893 11,527 1,348 11.7 .8,087 2,524
1889-1898 12,425 1,489 12.0 21,189 3,145
1894-1903 15,084 1,747 ii.6 26,126 5,5014
1899-IgoS 20,615 2,329 11.3 32,402 4,110
1904-1913 26,640 2,918 11.0 38,744 4,808
1909-1918 36,934 4,158 ii.5 15.°34 5.817
1914-1923 55,949 6489 ii.6 53,826 6.250
19,9-1928 71,887 7,792 io.8 6S,g8 6,905
1924-1933 70,064 4.652 6.6 73,316 .1,217
1929-1938 61,274i,o .i 71,110 ,,6ioa
consumption (this net flow to be subtracted from thelatter
to measure flow to ultimate users)was during the earlier
decades the same as during 1919-28.
b) New construc/jon
Mr. Shaw has also preparedestimates of the value ofout-
put (destined for domestic consumption) ofall Construc-
tion materials in current andconstant prices. But these esti-
mates include construction niateijals usedfor repairs and
maintenance of a type not considerednew construct ion and,
on the other hand, fail to take account oftransportation and
distribution costs; diversionto inventories all along the line
from producers of constructionmaterials to construction
enterprises; and most important,the cost of labor and
other constructioncosts. To allow for all these itemswe
have again assumed thatthe relations prevailing during
TABLE 3
Consumers' Durable Conimodities and Share of Capital
Formation (Gross and Net), includingConsumers'
Durable, in National Product(Gross and Net) per
Year, by Decades, 1879-1938
(columns i and 2 in millionsof dollars)
SHARE OF
CAPITAL FORMATION. INCL. cON.
st'MFp.s' DURABLE:, IN NATIONALPRODUCT
CONSUMERS'DURABI.F C 2 0 S S NF. Current 1929 Ciitrctit1929 Current1929 DECADE prices plices pricesprices pricesprices
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T
(i) (2) () (j) ('3) (6) 1879-i888 676 829 25.q 27.3 17.0 17.1 1884-1893 792 1,042 27.3 29.8 i8.6 19.8 i88g-i8gS 808 1,178 27.0 30.2 18.5 20.4 1894-1903 958 1,401 26.6 274 i8.o i8.8 1899-1908 1.382 1,734 26.4 27.3 i8.o i8,i 1904-1913 1.926 2,1gJ 26.7 27.1 '8.2 i8.i 1909-1918 2,852 3,og8 27.5 28.9 19.0 19.8 1914-1923 4.989 4.706 29.2 29.5 20.5 20.3 1919-1928 7.707 7,94 29.8 29.2 2I. 20.9 1924-1933 7.536 7,870 26.2 25.7 17.4 16.5 1929-1938 6.192 6,798 23.5 22.0 13.4 11.91919-28(for ratio of net flow to inventories to output des-
tined for domestic consumption)and 1919-33 (for ratios of
transportation and distribution costs toproducers' values
and of value of newconstruction to estimated consumption
of materials) held alsofor the earlier decades.
c) ConsumPtion ofproducers' durable commodities and
of conStrUCtlOfl
A thirteen-year life wasassumed for producers' durable and
a fifty-yearlife for construction (both along astraight line),
TABLE 4
Gross Capital Formationby Type of l'roduct Components
per Year, byDecades, 1879-1938
GROSS PERCENTAGE SHARES OF
CAPITAL All Net changes
FORMATIONProducers'con- Net in claims
(millions durablestrtuctionflow toagainst foreign
DECADE of dollars) (gross)(gross)inventoriescountries
BASED ON VALUES IN CURRENT PRICES
1879-1888 2.305 24.0 62.0 +159-'9
1884-1893 2,737 21.4 70.9 +9'
1889-1898 2,939 21.1 71.2 +7.8 _O.03
1894-1903 3,531 23.8 64.8 +12.7
1899-1908 4,680 27.2 6.6 +8..1 -'.3-'° 1904-1913 ,g88 26.8 65.1 +9-'
1909-1918 8..181 30.4 46.8 +11-2 +ta.6
1914-1923 13,288 30.5 38.7 +16.6 +1,1.2
1919-1928 ,6,i8t 30.5 52.7 +10.9 +6.0
1924-1933 13,063 34.0 64.0 -a-? +2.8
1929-1938 10,151 41.6 55.6 +°-7 +2.0




























































+2.2both assumptions based on Tablein Solomon Fabricant's
CapitalConsumption and Adjustment (NationalBureau of
Economic Research, 1938),p. i8i. Thus, a thirteen-year
moving average of the annual figureson the flow of pro
ducers' durable (at cost to ultimateusers) and a fifty-year
moving average of construction (six decades,the two ex-
tremes at half weight) yielded the estimates.The flow ofpro-
ducers' durable had to be extrapolatedfrom 1879 bickto
i866, and construction, backto 1829-18. The formerwas
estimated by interpolating betweenthe 1879 figure and Mr.
TABLE 5
Net Capital Formation by Typeof Product Components
per Year, by Decades, 1879-1938
NET PERCENTA(;F SHARES OF
CAPITAL All Net changes
FORMATIONProducers'con- Net in claims (millions durablestructionflow toagainst foreign DECADE of dollars) (net) (net)inventoriescountries
BASED ON VALUES IN CIIERENT PRICES
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3'145 6., 81.7 +12.3 _O.I
1899-1908
3,509 9.3 70.8 +22.4 -2.5 4,110 14.7 73.2 +'1-3 -2.3
1909-1918
















4.247 20.8 773 -7.0 +8.9 i.6to 40.2 49.1 -4.2 +15.0
1879-1888 1.073 194) 50.8 +34.2 -4.0 1884-1893i,8 ".6 72.8 +18.5 -3.0 1889-i8g8
'894-1903
1489 7.7 77° +'5-4
1899-1908
1,747 ii.8 65.1 +25.8 -.2.7 2,329 17.8 67.8 +16.9 -2.5 1904-1913
1909-1918












+29.1 7.792 19.7 45. +22.5 +12.4 1924-1933
1929-1938
4.652 ig.8 74.4 -2.1 +7.8 1.930 46.8 38.3 +44Shaw's preliminary figure for 1869 and extrapolating back
to i866 by the outputof pig iron. The extrapolation of total
construction before the 1879-88 decade was based upon an
index made up of: (i) net change in population in places of
2,500 and over(weight s) (2) net change in population in
places under 2,500 (weight 2), (3) net change in national in-
come in constantprices (weight). Items (i) and (2) were
taken from Population Trends in the United States, by
W. S. Thompson and P. K. Wheipton(McGraw-Hill, ig),
p. 20;item () from National Income in the United States,
TABLE 6







(millions Semi- sumers' in new
of dollars) Perishabledurabledurable commodities
BASED ON VALUES IN CURRENT PRICES
s87-I888 9,237 44.6 '7.5 7.3 30.6
1884-1893 10,179 43.0 17.2 7.8 32.0
i8Hg-i8g8 io,g6 43.0 16.2 74 33.4
.894-1903 13,337 44.0 15.3 7.2 33.5
i8gg-igo8 18,286 434 154 7.6
1904-1913 23,722 43.8 154 8.t 32.6
1909-1918 32.776 44.1 i.6 8.7 31.6
1914-1923 49460 41.2 17.1 10.1 31.7
1919-1Q28 64095 38.8 17.5 12.0 31.7
1924-1933 65,4.2 37.1 15.8 11.5 35.5
1929-1938 60,M4 38.8 14.7 10.3 36.2
BASED ON VALUES IN 1929 PRICES
1879-1888 13,411 50.0 15.2 6.2 28.5
1884-1893 15,563 48.9 154 6.7 29.0
1889-1898 18,045 48.8 15.2 6.5 29.5
1894-1903 22,617 49.2 14.6 6.2 304)
1899-1908 28,292 48.9 14.5 6.i 30.5
1904-1913 33,936 48.0 14.5 6.5 314)
1909-1918 39,217 46.2 14.4 7.9 31.5
1914-1923 47,576 42.7 14.8 9.9 32.6
1919-1928 61,694 39.2 15.2 12.0 33.7
1924-1933 69.070 38.9 15.2 114 34.5
1929-1938 69,501 40.2 15.2 9.8 34.90
'799-1938, by Robert F. Martin (NationalIndustrial Con.
ference Board, '939), Table1, pp. 6-7.
Thcsc cstiinaleswere used for the earlier decadesalone.
For the years since1919 we used the Commodity Flowand
Capital Formation estimates butapportioned them between
producers' equipment andconstruction on the basis oftheir
relative weights as shown by thepreliminary estimatescom-
puted by methods used for theearlier decades.
d) Net flow to inventories
Changes in stocks ofmonetary metals were measuredon the
basis of data in the AnnualReports of the Directorof the
Mint. Livestock figureswere from Gross Farm Income inthe United States, 1869_1937,by Frederick Straussand Louis
H. Bean, and from theBureau of AgriculturalEconomics.
Inventories in the hands ofmanufacturing firmswere esti-
mated by assuming thatthe ratio for the earlierdecades of
TABLE 7
Two Estimates ofNational Incomeper Year,
Compared by Decades,1879-1938




NA11ONAL INCOME BASED ON
Corn.ExtrapolationDIFENRENCE modity of present (2)
flow NBER- data estimates (t)
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61,27.1 6(1,580 -.694 3.2
36net flow to net increasein output of finished products was
the same as for19l9_28.20 Similar assumptions were made
for agriculture mining,and trade, estimates of gross volume
of activity in constantprices being obtained by extrapola-
ting the 1919-28 estimatesback over the earlier decades;
these extrapolations in turn werebased upon indexes of
crop productionsmining output, and a combined index of
all commodity output. Finally,the net flow to commodity
inventories of farmers, mines, manufacturingfinns, and
trade was raised to comprise total netflow to commodity in-
TABLE 8
National Product and Capital Formation,1919-1938
Current Prices (columns 1, 2, 4,and 5 in billions of dollars)
20 Except for 19 13-18 wheti the estimate wasextrapolated From 1919 by
sample data from Dun and Eradstreets.
37
GROSS %(2) N E T
NationalCapital ISOFNationalCapital ISOF
ysg productformation(i) productformation (4)
(i) (2) (3) (4) () (6)
1919 72.6 18.7 25.8 64.2 i6.o
1920 84 5 25.3 74.2 114 15.3
1921 o6.8 10.7 i6.o 594 3.3 5.5
1q22 67.8 i i.6 17.1 60.7 4.5 74
1923 79.7 16.7 21.0 71.6 8.6 12.0
1924 80.1 13.9 174 72.1
1925 84.2 17.5 20.8 76.0 9.3 12.2
igz6 go i8.o 19.9 8t.6 9.2 11.3
1927 88.9 17.0 19.1 80.i 8.2 10.2
1928 90.8 i6. 18.2 81.7 74 9.0
1929 g6.8 ig.6 20.2 87.2 10.0 11.5
1930 86.5 '3.4 15.5 77.3 4.2 54
0.2
1931 68.6 8.4 12.2 60.3 0.1
193* 50.1 3.0 6.o 42.9 _4.2 -9.7
-8.6



































ventories by a ratio basedupon a comparison for1919-28 of changes in these fourgroups of commodity inventorieswith changes in all commodityinventories as given inCo1nmod ity Flow and CapitalFormation, Vol. One.
e) Changes in net claimsagainst foreigncountries
For the earlier decadesthe estimatesare based on data in
The Balance of Tradeof the United States,by C. J. Bullock,
J.F!. Williams, and R.S. Tucker (Reviewof Economic Sta- /is/iu, July 1919,PP224-52).In general, theprocedure was to estabjtsfi for eachdecade the balanceof merchatdjse trade, then to raise itto the balance ofmerchandise trade, freight charges, interestcharges, touristexpenditures immi- grant remittances, andmiscehjancotis items. Theseother items, unlikemerchandise trade,not being availablean-
TABLE 9
















































54.0 24.8 78.8 21.2
1911) 29.2
48.7 30.9 79.6 20.4














































38nually, the raising ratioused for each decade had to be taken
for the period inthe study that was closest to the decade
involved.
jValve of services not embodiedin new commodities
The estimate inboth current and constant prices was de-
rived for the last two decades by acomparison of estimates of
national income, net capitalformation, and the flow of
finished commodities toultimate consumers. The ratio for
iglq.-28 (in constant prices) ofthe value of these services to
the value of consumers'finished commodities was extrapo-
lated for 190g-18 on the basisof data in High Level Con-
sum ption, byW. H. Lough (McGraw-Hill,1935); for
earlier decades, on the basisof the composition of wage
earners' cost of living as shownby U. S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics and Massachusetts Bureauof Labor Statistics
data.2' With this ratio andestimates of perishable semi-
TABLE 10
Consumers' Outlay per ConsumingUnit per Year,
by Decades, 1879-1938, 1929Prices
21 It should also be noted that the divisionbetween commodities andservices
of the farmer's and the urbandweller's consumers' outlay isquite similar
(see E. L. Kirkpatrick TheFanner's Standard of Living,U. S. Department






IWCADE of dollars) (thousands) (dollars)
1879-1888 13,411 7,4i4 358
1884-1893 15.563 42,238 368
1889-1898 18,045 47,084 383
1894-1903 22,617 52,068 434
1899-1908 28,292 57,634 491









1929-1938 69.501 91,802 757
F.-
Idurable, and consumers' durable coiiimodities,we estimated
services, in constant prices. A price index ofservices was
then derived from prices of commodities,on the assump-
tion (based on the changes in thetwo indexes from 1919-28
to 1929-38) that changes in the formerwere about half of
changes in the latter.
g) Alternative estimates of national income
Gross and net national product inTables i-6 were esti-
mated by adding to consumers' outlaygross and net capital
formation. In view of the obviouscrudeness of the estimates,
we experimented with another estimate ofnational income.
For I9I!_sS we took therecent National Bureau estimates
of national income excludinggovernment savings and unad-
justed for the effects,on savings of enterprises, of inventory
revaluation, of the use of thecost basis for depreciation arid
depletion deductions, and ofthe inclusion of capitalgains and losses. We extrapolatedthis series back to1910 by esti-
mates in income in the United States(National Bureau of
Lcoiioinjc Research, 1921),Table I,p. 13. It was then car-
ried back from1910 to 1870, for 1870, i88o, 1890,1900. by
W. I. King's estimates inl:Vealth and Income of thePeople of the United States(Macmillan, 1qi5),p. 132. To obtain
annual estimates for theyears prior to 1910, we interpolated
by an index derivedby multiplyingcomprehensive produc-
tion itidexes by the Bureauof Labor Statisticswholesale price index. Theproduction indexes used forthis purpose were: for the decadeIgoolo, the Persons indexof crop
production, industrialprodLiction, and trade (seeReview of Economic Statistics,Aug. 1933,p. 156); for the earlier
decades a product of theWarren-Pearson per capitaproduc- tion index (see CornellAgricultural ExperimentStation Farm Economics,June1937, p. 2497) anda total population
index basedon series in the StatisticalAbstract of the United States.
From this series anotherestimate of the valueof services
40not embodicdin flew commodities can be obtained by sub-
tracting net capitalformation plus commodity flow to coil-
sumers.
The comparison inTable 7 shows fairly substantial dif-
ferences betweenthis annual series of national income esti-
mates and the oneused in Tables i -6 (based on commodity
flow and capitalformation data). The differences during the
last threeoverlapping decades are due exclusively tothe
omission in the new seriesof the adjustments mentioned
above. The much moresubstantial differences for the
decades from 1894-1903through 19o9-18 are due to other
factors; and these differences arenaturally relatively greater
when related to thesmaller, derivative item of the valueof
services not embodied in newcommodities.
We decided to use theestimates based on commodity flow
and capital formation data,because their derivation was
better known to us thanthat of Mr. King's estimatesfor the
years before iio;and because the relative movementof the
value of services notembodied in new commoditiesand its
size, as derived in Tablesi-6, agreed so much betterwith
the few other data on thesubject that are available thanthe
residual estimates for the sameitem derived by comparing
this new extrapolated series onnational income with tile
other components. Yet thedifferences in Table 7 do indicate
a possible errorin both series and serve toemphasize the
preliminary character of theestimates in Tables m-6and
the need for checking themin the light of furtherand more
detailed analysis. It is our hopethat such analysis willbe
developed in the work at theNational Bureau by Mr. Shaw
on commodity flowanti capital formation,and by Lillian
Epstein on national income, for aperiod back to 1 880.
SOURCES OF TABLES8-mo
Table 8. Annual estimates ofnational income and netcapi-
tal formation are fromNational Income and ItsCorn posi-
tion, 1919-1938, Table7, 1, 269.Estimates of capital con-
4)0
Sumption are by Mr. Fabricaju(see his Capital (:onszmp_
lion and Adjustment), revisedin minor respects andbrought through1938.The addition of these totalsof capitalcon- suluption to net capital forniationand nationalincome yields gross capitalformation and gross nationalproduct respectively.
Table. Estimates for 1880npo are from W. I.King's Wealth and Incomeof the People of the UnitedStates and cited in the article,National Income, in theEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences.Data from 1910on are from W. I. King's
l\Tatjo,,21 incomeand Its PurchasingPower (National Bureau of EconomicResearch, 1930), andfromNational income and itsComposition, r919i93c.Mr. King's data
were revised to attaingreater comparabilit)' withour more recent estimates.
Table io. Estimatesof consumers' outlayare from Table 6. The number ofconsuming units is basedupon estimates by Thompson andlVhelpton (op. cit.,p. 169). These esti- mates, given attwenty-year intervals,were converted into an annual series byan interpolation basedupon total popu- lation; decadeaverages were thencomputed from the annual series.
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